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In approaching the interrelationships among costs, pricing, and regula-
tion, it is assumed that our interest is in allocative efficiency. Regulation
may be construed as a measure designed to bridge any gaps between
private and public interests that might be occasioned by inappropriate
price-cost relations stemming from managerial pricing policies. Such
gaps may arise at either end of the pricing scale, or from rates that are
inimicable to the public interest because they are too low as well as
from those that are too high.
Relevant questions with respect to rate floors include the cost con-
cepts that appropriately govern private and regulatory pricing policy
in competitive situations and the way costs are employed in this crucial
aspect of regulation.Since the primary downward pressures on rates
are generally conceded to be attributable to the railroads, a special look
at their pricing policies is in order. While specific patterns and applica-
tions may be changing as a result of new competitive pressures,
discrimination remains the hallmark of ratesystems.Although
frequently inferred,it has certainly not been established through
present regulatory tests that inappropriately high price-cost ratios are
out of the question.Accordingly, our discussion will be concerned
with the appropriate employment of costs by regulators in setting both
the upper and lower pricing boundaries within which managerial
discretion should be free to operate.
Costs and Pricing: Governing Cost Concepts
It may seem surprising that a matter so thoroughly explored in the
literature of economics as the costs which are relevant for pricing should
require further attention. But it is apparent from a review of recent
literature on transportation economics that the matter is not so4 COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION
straightforward as might be expected. There is no reason to be con-
cerned about the wild and heated controversy over principles among
affected partisan transportation interests.But there is evidence of
intellectual disagreement among disinterested students of the transport
pricing problem which extends to either or both the governing economic
principles and their applicability to transport as a special case. Ac-
cordingly, it will be useful to review some recent views on the subject,
both to illustrate the areas of disagreement and, hopefully, to rationalize
the main points of contention.
The basic issue to which most other questions are subsidiary is
whether competitive rates should be "predicated on" or "related to"
some measure of incremental or marginal costs as a floor, or whether
they should be formally tied to "full costs" through regulatory dicta.
The latter contemplates a formal "accounting" assignment to specific
services or classes of output of those cost elements which escape
measurement under the marginal principle.
The most recent statement supporting the unique relevance of
incremental costs as a pricing reference is that advanced by a panel of
ten economists in the October 1962 issue of the Journal of Business.'
Being a member of that group and, along with the others, a subscriber
to the principles it advanced, I consider this article a useful starting
point for the present discussion.It is essentially a restatement of
orthodox principles generally accepted, at least in the abstract, by most
economists, and can be summarized very briefly.
1. Railroads manifest a greater proportion of unallocable costs than
is found in most industries. These unallocable components arise from
both the high level of fixed costs and the significant elements of joint
and common costs that characterize the industry.
2. Of vital importance for the argument and for further discussion is
that, while fixity lapses into variability as the time dimension extends
and sights are changed from short- to long-run considerations, a
substantial proportion of rail costs remain fixed even over time spans
far longer than are really relevant for any managerial or regulatory
decisions.Since the cost fixities persist and the joint and common
components are unaffected by the time dimension, the unallocability
of costs is far more than a short-run phenomenon and untraceable
'William J. Baumol et a!., "The Role of Cost in the Minimum Pricing of
Railroad Services," TheJournal of Business, October1962, pp.1—10.The complete
panel of authors includes William J. Baumol, Burton N. Behling, James C.
Bonbright, Yale Brozen, Joel Dean, Ford K. Edwards, Calvin B. Hoover,
Dudley F. Pegrum, Merrill J. Roberts, and Ernest W. Williams, Jr.COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION 5
elementsare extremely important even for relatively long-term con-
siderations. This is far less true of truck and barge line costs.
3. The relevant cost reference for pricing decisions is marginal (or
incremental) cost since this measure provides the test for the profit-
ability of a pricing decision.In social terms, comparative marginal
costs, which provide the economically valid measure of the value of
resources used, offer the appropriate guide as to which agency is the
most efficient alternative.
4. Coverage of the overheads created by the common and joint and
the persistently fixed costs can only be achieved through "assignments"
to specific services or classes of services that reflect market conditions
and thus depend upon service demands. Rates higher than those thus
dictated would restrict utilization of the fixed rail plant, artificially
inflate shipper costs, and thus contribute to economic inefficiency.
5.Derivationsof fully allocated costs through arbitrary assignment
of the unallocable, as a means for recovering the overheads, is an
economically invalid and pernicious device to measure comparative
efficiency or to establish relative competitive prices for different modes.
But the lack of unanimity on these matters is manifest by some
citations from other recent literature. One striking case is found in the
so-called "Doyle Report" prepared for the Senate Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce.2 This study concludes that, with
some minor qualifications, rate changes which enhance departures from
fully distributed costs are presumptively unreasonably related to
costs.3Professor George Wilson in his recent volume of essays un-
equivocably prescribes that competitive rates should be based on the
fully allocated costs of the low cost carrier, who would be identified by
this measure.4 Although clearly not accepted as a guide to their own
policy recommendations, Professor Meyer and his associates indicate
in their study that one of the historical purposes of minimum rate
control was to prevent a carrier (or agency) with lower short-run
marginal costs but higher average (or long-run marginal) cost from
uneconomically usurping traffic from a competitor.5 Although other
2National Transportation Policy, PreliminaryDraft of a Report Prepared for the
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, U.S. Senate, by the Special Study
Group on Transportation Policies in the United States, Committee Print, 87th
Congress, 1st Session, 1961.
Ibid., p.444.
George Wilson, Essayson Some Unsettled Questions in the Economics of Trans-
portation, Bureauof Business Research, Indiana University, 1962, Pp. 83—84.
John R. Meyer, Merton J. Peck, John P. Stenason, and Charles Zwick, The
Economics of Competition in the Transportation Industries, HarvardUniversity Press,
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citations might be offered, these bring into focus the significant issues
and are frequently cited by others to establish the intellectual respect-
ability of the "full-cost doctrine" in transportation pricing policy.
It will be noted that one of the main sources of difficulty is the persistent
failure to deal realistically (in terms of relevance for public and private
decision making) with the time horizons of cost variability.
The Doyle Report gives lip service to the economic attributes and
virtues of long-run marginal costs:
The recommendation that long-run marginal costs be defined as the
appropriate floor to competitive ratemaking is sound long-range policy and
will provide a basis for achieving rate structures which reflect the true cost
advantages of the diverse modes.
But the Doyle Report's definitions of long-run marginal and long-run
out-of-pocket costs, which are regarded as virtually synonymous,
embrace some puzzling references. At first glance these appear to be
simply matters of loose terminology but they color the use of the
concepts and cloud some vital relationships.For example, long-run
out-of-pocket cost gives due consideration "to all fixed and indfrect
costs which are incurred because of the extra unit of production."
While confusing, this usage might be harmless if it did not influence
further thought about cost relations.
The vitiation of the important conceptual distinction between fully-
distributed costs and long-run marginal (or out-of-pocket) costs
spawned by the defective definitions begins in earnest with the ob-
servation that the fixed costs of the past may or may not be appro-
priately considered in evaluating "the true fixed costs of additional
production." And "if, in fact, they are appropriate guides to fixed costs
which are incurred in additional production, it makes little difference
in practice whether one refers to fully-distributed costs or long-run
marginal or long-run out-of-pocket costs."It is then an easy step
to the proposition that "suitable" long-run marginal costs include a
return sufficient "to defray all appropriate fixed and indirect costs,
thus insuring continued production."
This view suggests that over the long run, all costs are variable, and
that if full account is taken of investment requirements and the as-
sociated costs imposed by added traffic, all costs will be traceable and
BNationalTransportation Policy, p. 441.
Ibid., emphasis mine.
BIbid.
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no arbitrary allocations will be required. But the "theoretically pure"
long run (contemplating complete variability) is, in the railroad case,
an abstraction completely devoid of practical significance. As is well
known, large elements of rail plant are not reproduced over very long
time periods, and other investment as well lags far behind output.
Substantial elements of rail cost remain fixed over any period relevant
for either management or regulatory decisions. The variability that
would be required to identify empirically fully-distributed costs with
long-run marginal costs would have to be based on calculations stretch-
ing out into such an indefinite future as to be meaningless, because of
the unpredictability of technological change as well as other factors,
such as demand shifts.
The "long-run" concept may be employed in another way which is
far more meaningful for railroads—that is, as a time period adequate
to permit full accommodation of the plant to any output changes which
may be realized.In this meaning, investment levels may change and
short-run fixed costs will vary, but it is not necessary to contemplate
that all investment costs must have thus varied before a meaningful
"long-run" calculation can be made. This is, of course, the conception
of the "long-run" that is implicit in the cross-section analyses that
undertake to measure cost variability. These analyses cover the wide
range of outputs and traffic densities that characterize the nation's
railroads and provide empirical support for the reality of "long-term"
fixities.Precisely because they do cover such a wide range of densities
these analyses tend, if anything, to understate the fixed components and
to overstate the long-run marginal costs that are really relevant for
economic decisions; accordingly, they represent a highly conservative
technique. In their measurements of long-run marginal costs, Meyer
and his associates identify costs totalling a "reasonably substantial
sum" which "represent unallocable overhead costs in the best em-
pirical meaning of that term." 10Accordingly,any realistic measure
of "long-run" marginal costs will not exhaust all costs to insure against
bankruptcy, and uncovered overheads will have to be assigned either
arbitrarily or on a demand basis.Furthermore, the untraceability
attributable to common and joint costs will not be washed out regard-
less of the time horizon of cost measurements.
Failure to recognize this empirical distinction between fully dis-
tributed and long-run marginal costs is reflected in the final recom-
mendations on cost and pricing of the Doyle Report. One prescription
Meyer efa!., Economics of Competition, p. 49.8 COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION
is that "rate changes which result in rates that depart further from fully
distributed costs than at present, may be presumed to produce rates
unreasonably related to costs, unless specific evidence can be presented
to demonstrate that such rates are reasonably related to long-run
marginal costs."Exceptfor changes in the prices of factor inputs,
long-run marginal cost (as realistically defined) will be less than fully
distributed costs.Unless a rate is already below marginal costs, any
reduction will inevitably bring it more closely into line with that
measure.
Wilson does not merely flirt with fully distributed cost as does the
Doyle Report, but embraces it affectionately. He finds that "the most
sensible policy would be to have the rates based upon the fully allocated
costs of the low-cost carrier (that is, the carrier whose fully allocated
cost is lowest).•"12Heis explicitly led to this espousal of fully
distributed costs through the traditional rule that "in the long run all
costs are variable and the fixed-cost category disappears." 13But,
unlike the Doyle Report, he does not argue from this to the practical
identity of fully allocated and long-run marginal costs.Rather, he
realistically recognizes the distinction between train-journeys as the
basic output unit and tons or ton-miles as the sales unit; this creates
indivisibilities for pricing purposes that persist over the long run.
It is these indivisibilities that are arbitrarily prorated in his concept of
fully distributed cost. He explicitly rejects what he defines as the usual
meaning of fully distributed cost, which involves the allocation of
short-run fixed costs, and presumes away any problem of allocating
fixities in something greater than the short run.
The earlier comments regarding appropriate and realistic time
horizons for the railroad case are applicable here and need not be
repeated. However, the pro rata allocation of the indivisible variables
requires a closer look. Wilson observes with respect to these indivisible
costs that pro rata allocation is both simple and based on precedent'4—
attributes that are respectively questionable and irrelevant. These costs
appear to be nothing more than members of the common and joint
cost family which, as Wilson himself recognizes in another section of
his volume, can only be recovered on a noncost (or demand) basis.15
He is, nevertheless, dubious about the cost allocating function of
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demand in competitive markets (although the endorsement mentioned
is not apparently reserved for noncompetitive situations), arguing that
there is "a 'critical' point in the operation of an enterprise with large
elements of indirect or indivisible costs beyond which further applica-
tions of the marginal cost principle can only lead to economic loss;
along with this is a corresponding withdrawal of capital or elimination
of operations for which rates not much above directly traceable costs
have been quoted." 16Itis not particularly helpful, however, to suggest
that profit maximizing through demand pricing is acceptable for some
portion of output, but that the bulk of sales must be made at prices
above the best the market will permit.
This suggestion that competition in transportation is inherently
ruinous is of doubtful validity.'7But even if it is true, there is no
particular reason for seizing on fully distributed cost as a pricing
reference point, plagued as it is with such serious defects as arbitrar-
iness and circular relationships with volume.18If Commission inter-
vention is needed to prevent the ruinous gravitation of rates, other
less objectionable standards are available, including, for example,
some minimum markup above long-run out-of-pocket costs.
Despite his formal adherence to fully distributed cost as a competitive
pricing guideline, Wilson fortunately does not allow it to intrude too
seriously into his substantive policy recommendations.Indeed, he
expresses great admiration for "value of service pricing," where the
cost and quality of a rival's offerings are the key value measures. Much
of this retreat is dictated by wholesome respect for the power of actual
or potential private carriage as a market conditioner. it would appear
that the fully distributed cost concept, however defined, is as flabby in
practice as it is in principle.
Although cited only as an historical argument for minimum rate
control and clearly not a reflection of the policy conclusions of the
study, a passage in the work of the Meyer group has been loosely used
as theoretical support for full-cost pricing.Accordingly, it offers a
useful focus for a further consideration of some significant issues of
16Ibid.,p.83.
For one contrary set of arguments on this subject see Merrill J. Roberts, "The
Regulation of Transport Price Competition," LawandContemporary Problems,
Autumn 1959,pp. 557—585.
Wilsonseems to get into somewhat the same box that the Doyle Report did
with respect to the ambiguity in the measurement of fully distributed cost: "What
the full cost Criterion basically means is that rates in intercarrier competition should
be based upon the average cost of normal, anticipated traffic volumes." Wilson,
SomeUnsettledQuestions, p. 85 (emphasis mine).10 COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION
competitive price regulation. This passage refers to regulatory policy
which is designed to prevent the movement of traffic by a carrier with
lower marginal but higher average costs than a rival.19Apparently
this policy is concerned with the inefficiency of penalties if a highly
transitory cost advantage is converted to higher resource costs.
The railroads characteristically introduce the anomaly of lower
marginal but higher average costs than a competitor.But further
consideration of comparative cost structures reveals that the marginal
cost advantage of rails, predicated on the realistic "long-run" concept
that full plant adjustment is made to output increases, is apt to be quite
persistent.Marginal cost, it will be recalled, is not a component of
total cost at a given output level, but the addition to total costs as-
sociated with increasing volume.20Social efficiency is, for example,
concerned with a comparison of the added rail or truck costs that will
result if a given block of output is carried by one mode or the other.
Precise determinations of the added costs that might be expected in
specific situations undoubtedly require close consideration of the lay-
ering and cycling of railroad investment. But appropriately designed
cross-section analyses, extrapolating from the cost experience of other
companies with higher output levels, provide a valid indicator of the
investment requirements and the associated costs that can generally be
expected from output increments.Such "long-run" marginal costs
provide at least the basic foundation of rail cost measurements from
which efficiency may be realistically determined. Cost measures ex-
ceeding this level reflect an artificial or contrived degree of variability
and thus offer a poor test of comparative efficiency.
As the foregoing suggests, a number of efficiency penalties may be
incurred by hewing too closely to the comparative average cost line.
Since reproduction of much of the rail investment that is reflected in
average costs is long deferred, while truck investment turnover is
relatively rapid, it might be worthwhile to take advantage of the free
capacity availability reflected in the lower marginal costs of rails.If
one or two generations of truck investment (over, say, five to ten years)
can be avoided, a clear social saving is realized regardless of longer
term outcomes. In addition, increases in output levels may by them-
selves change the average cost relationships and put the railroad in the
low-cost position by that standard as well. Furthermore, technological
improvements may intervene to produce the same result.These
Meyer ela!., Economics of Competition, p. 249.
20 Thisis a reminder which Professor Samuelson felt compelled to offer in his
Foundationsof Economic Analysis, Cambridge,1947,pp.241—242.COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION 11
considerations suggest the folly of excluding railroads from markets
where they demonstrate lower long-run marginal costs, regardless of
comparative average costs.
Although not so clear cut, the foregoing considerations are appli-
cable in some degree to relatively short-run pricing situations, as well
as to the "long-run" in which there is full plant adjustment to expanded
output. The relevant pricing horizon for management is clearly deter-
mined by the duration of the expected revenue change. According to
the panel statement:
The decision is governed by such revenue dimensions as the nature and
amount of the comtemplated change in volume, the length of the commitment
to carry the traffic, the duration and geographic scope of the changed rate,
the alterations of the service that might require added investments, and the
time period in which changes may legally or practically take place.2'
Accordingly, profit considerations may dictate a strictly short-run
view of costs.This is clearly true if the pricing decision involves a
temporary rate (such as one covering the movement of material to
a construction project), but extends also to the general case where
fuller plant utilization requires a consideration of short-run demand
characteristics. There are good reasons to presume that pricing based
on short-run marginal costs is not only profitable but is also consistent
with efficient resource allocation, particularly since the railroad short
run corresponds closely with the long run of a truck competitor.If
rail prices predicated on a short-run cost reference are all the market
will allow, replacement of the assets required to produce the service
involved will be neither socially economic nor privately profitable,
dictating substitute investment in an alternative mode. in the mean-
time, the economy will have enjoyed the use of the available capacity.
However, economies realized from fuller utilization of available facil-
ities must be weighed against the costs associated with such possible
short-run dislocations as the elimination of firms with greater long-run
efficiency.Accordingly, some "compromise" restrictions on strictly
short-run pricing by railroads in competitive situations may be a
required function of regulation.
As these considerations imply, maximizing returns with rates above
marginal costs and below full costs does not occasion a reduction of
investment below some socially desirable level.Full cost pricing,
which necessarily reflects past investment costs which are unrelated
to facility use, does not supply valid investment guidance. Enforcing
21Baumoleta!., inTheJournal of Business, October1962, p. 3.12 COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION
this pricing policy where such costs are higher than "maximizing"
prices (the relevant and interesting regulatory case) will in itself impose
artificial restrictions on future investment levels.Sensible manage-
ment and public policy requires prices that will permit the assets
employed to earn as much as the market will allow. Whether the replace-
ment ultimately occurs depends upon the fruitfulness of the maximizing
goal, with the decision necessarily made at replacement time. Such a
process can be socially objectionable only if the earnings are excessive.
The stifling of marginal costs—particularly those associated with
reasonably long-term horizons that reflect the investment requirements
of traffic increments—cannot serve the public interest.
Market-Oriented Rates and Distribution Efficiency
Despite the established relevance of marginal costs as a measure of
comparative efficiency and as a price floor, a system of market-oriented
rates predicated on profit maximizing may still be open to question.
There may be concern, for example, about unduly high charges in
inelastic markets, or excessive discrimination (which is discussed in a
later section).But the pricing system contemplated must also pass
muster in other important respects, particularly on the validity of the
resulting intermodal traffic allocation. The question is whether inter-
modal price relations may be expected to square with relevant cost
relations when prices are designed to maximize contributions above
incremental costs.This discussion is independent of the contention
that this goal will produce a disorderly gravitation of rates to "ruinous"
levels.It may be assumed either that such ruinous pricing is not to be
expected or that regulation will prevent it.
Where the services of the various agencies in a given market are
homogeneous, carrier demand functions are identical and in the
maximizing process the carrier with the lower marginal cost presumably
can (and will) generate the lower price.As a result, shippers will
generally select the low-cost mode to achieve both private and social
efficiency. Such service-quality homogeneity is certainly not unknown
in some market situations. In others, shippers' requirements may make
them indifferent to qualitative differences.In either case, traffic allo-
cations are sensitive only to lower rates predicated on lower costs.
But it is more probable that such homogeneity or shipper indifference
is a special case.Where qualitative differences enter into shippers'
calculations, it is important to recognize the rather obvious (but occa-
sionally overlooked) proposition that efficient traffic allocations areCOSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION 13
not determined exclusively by comparative transport (movement)
costs, but must also take account of the different level of nontransport
distribution costs associated with the employment of alternative agen-
cies. As a result of these quality disparities, the simple proposition
that low movement costs are determinative is inapplicable.
According to this reckoning, the most efficient carrier is the one
offering the lowest sum of transport costs (measured by MC) and
nontransport distribution costs associated with its employment (NrC).
Employing the rail-truck illustration, distribution efficiency is deter-
mined by a comparison of+ and + Shippers,
however, are swayed by the comparative prices (F) and not carrier
costs, requiring a consideration of P —MCmargins, or "markup"
(MU). Accordingly, distribution efficiency requires that where (for
example) + NTCT exceeds + IYTC1, then F,. + NTC,. must
exceed+ In other words, the concern is whether rates which
would be established under a market-oriented pricing system would
divert traffic from the alternative agency offering the lower total distribu-
tion cost (MC +NTC). Serious consideration of this question offers
scope for a major inquiry, but it is useful to give some attention to it even
in a preliminary and tentative way.
It is simplest to proceed by assuming at the outset an "all or nothing"
situation, where all available traffic in the market will be allocated to
one or the other of the rivals depending on comparative distribution
costs. This condition would be realized if there were only one shipper
in the market or if all shippers had identical distribution requirements
and thus qualitative evaluations.The governing relationships are
illustrated in Figure 1.
In case I, one agency has both lower MC and lower NTC, and in II,
one has lower MC but higher NTC. The shipper in case I will employ
trucks so long as the "markup" does not produce a rate which makes
the cost of rail distribution less. In a system of market-oriented prices,
there is no reason to expect a rate to be established at that level.In
this case, the traffic moves by the carrier affording both the lower
marginal cost and the lower distribution costs.The indicated truck
rate appropriately attracts the traffic to the more efficient system.
In case II A, rail enjoys lower marginal cost but truck affords lower
distribution cost. The indicated rate limits are the same as above.
In this case, however, in the interest of over-all efficiency, traffic moves
by the carrier with the higher MC.CaseU B illustrates another im-
portant point:if the relative prices were governed by a rule requiring
each competitor to observe the same P/MC ratio, the traffic would beCOSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION 15
a single NTC for each agency, there will be a variety of them, depending
on the specific distribution requirements. At any given price, shippers
will compare P + NTC and select the mode which minimizes their
distribution costs.If they are rank-ordered according to the NTC
associated with (for example) rail movements, they will be successively
attracted to rail service by progressively lower rates (assuming, as in the
traditional demand function, that the price of the substitute truck
service remains unchanged). They will come over to rail, in other
words, when for them F,. + is less than+
In establishing "maximizing" rates, the competitors will be confronted
with comparative costs (MC) and NTC measurements. Prices will be
set at a point where the P + NTC values attract the traffic volume
which will maximize net revenues. The carrier with the generally lower
set of MC + NTC values will, in a sense, "control" the market as in
the previous case.Accordingly, the "all or nothing" situation pre-
viously postulated appears to be representative of discrete points along a
demand function. It can be roughly equated with a "consensus" or a
weighted average of the comparative NTC measures of shippers with
varying distribution requirements. In this case, competitive considera-
tions will sufficiently restrain the P —MCratio of the carrier with the
lower range of MC + NTC combinations in a specific market to
prevent a higher P + NTC combination. The result is thus the same as
was indicated for the "all or nothing" market, and the price relations
described there may be regarded as representative of a specific maxi-
mizing price.
The situation here is complicated by the variety of shipper reactions
to specific price relationships.If prices are set as in the foregoing
illustration (F,. =55and=80cents) some traffic will be shipped by
each alternative, depending on particular NTC measures. Although
higher or lower NTC values will appear identically in both the measures
of shipper distribution costs (P + NTC) and of real costs (MC + NTC),
a simple illustration reveals that the variation in these values can
occasion price-cost relations inimical to efficient distribution.With
the former NTC values (r= .60,t =.40)rail transportation was most
efficient and, under the resulting comparative rates, also represented
the shipper's choice. But for a shipper with higher ]VTCr (70 cents) and
lower (35 cents) measures, .the efficiency results are quite different
with the same set of prices.The following relationships emerge in
this case:
P,. + NTCr$1.25 MCr + NTCr =$.90
+ NTC1 =1,10 + =.9516 COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION
Here truck transport offers lower distribution costs to the shipper, but
higher real costs.It appears that variations in shipper distribution
requirements in the face of a single market price (and price relationship)
may indeed defeat efficiency as measured by the criterion employed.
As the foregoing illustration suggests, this anomaly arises where the
intercarrier NTC differences are large in terms of marginal transport
cost differences.It can arise predominantly from one direction—that
is, where the services of the carrier with the low marginal cost are
"undervalued" by some shippers in terms of the concensus value upon
which the rate was predicated.It might be inferred from this that
efficiency departures are most apt to be associated with truck move-
ments of traffic where rail offers the lowest real distribution costs.
If, however, the maximizing prices represent a consensus or weighted
average, the probability is good that most traffic allocations will pass
the efficiency test. In this case, there is reason for hoping that market-
oriented rates built on the foregoing model will do a reasonably ad-
equate job of preserving and fostering distribution efficiency.
Full evaluation requires, however, some consideration of how closely
the model represents the real world. Although it probably reflects
what enlightened shippers and carriers do or should try to do, it clearly
contemplates perfect and unattainable knowledge on the part of both,
including (as a particular difficulty) carrier measurements of NTC.
This is perhaps not really serious and is certainly no indictment of
market-oriented transport prices, since perfection of knowledge and
measurements is not achieved in the economy generally.But itis
apparent that rational carrier pricing requires intimate understanding
of shipper distribution systems.It is equally clear that distribution
efficiency depends at least as much on rational shipper purchasing
decisions as it does on carrier pricing policy.
Costs and Minimum Rate Regulation
The ICC's distrust of marginal costs (or the "long-run out-of-pocket
costs" generated by its staff) as a comparative efficiency measure is well
documented.22 It is nepessary only to emphasize that the Commission
is wed to the proposition that the competitor with the lower full costs is
the more efficient and that his costs should set the floor under com-
petitive rate adjustments.The governing viewpoint has frequently
been characterized by this quotation from Commissioner Freas:23
22 See, for example, Roberts, in Law and Contemporary Problems, Autumn 1959,
pp. 560—561.
23 Rate-Making Rule, Hearings before the Senate Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on S. 3778, 85th Congress, 2nd Session, 1958, p. 172.COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION 17
In many instances, however, the full costs of the low-cost form of trans-
portation exceed the out-of-pocket costs of another. If, then, we are required
to accept the rates of the high-cost carrier merely because they exceed its
out-of-pocket costs, we see no way of preserving the inherent advantages of
the low-cost carrier.
According to the principles enunciated earlier, the general result of this
policy is apt to be a misallocation of traffic and presumably of invest-
ment, where, as is usually the case, long-run, out-of-pocket cost meas-
ures are involved.
It might be noted additionally that these cost doctrines are ap-
parently becoming more thoroughly solidified through the processes of
judicial review.In a recent appeal from a Commission decision, a
Federal District Court took occasion to elaborate on the cost consider-
ations governing competitive rate determinations under regulation.24
This Court uncritically accepted the assumed identity between "long-
run" and "fully-distributed" costs, reflecting the common failure to
gear cost generalizations to the cost situations of particular agencies.
Accordingly, it found that "the inherent advantages of lower cost
refers to the long-run or fully-distributed costs of carriage." 25 By the
same token, out-of-pocket costs are regarded as being identified neces-
sarily with the short run.The Court is, therefore, concerned that
"rates set by reference to out-of-pocket cost may favor what in the
long run is the less efficient, higher cost mode."26
These pronouncements reflect the failure to recognize some of the
distinctions pointed out in this discussion, particularly that in the rail-
road case incremental costs can have a long-run meaning that clearly
differentiates them conceptually and empirically from fully-distributed
costs. As previously argued, preventing a carrier with a strictly transi-
tory short-run cost advantage from taking traffic from a competitor
with tower long-run costs may represent an economically valid exercise
of regulatory authority. But because of its confused long- and short-run
21U.S. DistrictCourt, DistrictofConnecticut, The New York,NewHaven and
Hartford RailroadCompany v. United States and Interstate Commerce Commission,
Civil Action No. 8679 (1961) (Mimeo).
25 Ibid.,p. 10.
26 Ibid. In a decision on review, rendered after the completion ofthispaper, the
U.S. Supreme Court overturned some of the District Court's opinions, but not
those pertaining to the role and interpretation of costs.It observed that: "It is not
for us. .. to decide in advance precisely how either carrier's inherent advantage
should be measured or protected." But the Court continued with a further observa-
tion of some possible future significance: "It may be, for example, that neither a
comparison of 'out-of-pocket' nor a comparison of 'fully-distributed' costs, as those
terms are defined by the Commission, is the appropriate method of deciding which
of two competing modes has the cost advantage on a given movement." Cited in
TrafficWorld,April 27, 1963, p. 134.18 COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION
identifications, the Court fails to realize that achieving this objective
does not require the adoption of "fully-distributed" costs as a railroad
rate floor.It is clear that greater economic understanding must be
introduced into the processes of regulation if viable rate relations are
to be fostered and permitted.
In supporting its application for reductions in grain rates, the South-
ern Railway introduced an abundance of economic evidence designed
to clarify the crucial cost concepts and relations that have been exam-
ined.While the reduced rates were authorized by Division 2 over
barge line protests, there is no evidence that this is attributable to any
change in the Commission's thinking regarding the governing role of
fully-distributed costs in competititive situations.27Rather, it effec-
tively dodged the question of relevant cost references for intermodal
competition by introducing a novel notion for such proceedings.It
found that the uncompensated costs for publicly provided waterway
(and presumably highway) facilities should be included in cost com-
parisons designed to identify the most efficient carrier.AEthough
Southern introduced some measurements, the Commission found them
of questionable accuracy. Not having definitive measurements of these
public costs, it concluded that it was unable to reach a decision regard-
ing "inherent advantages" and, since the rates were "compensatory,"
permitted them to become effective.
This aspect of the case is consistent with past policy. The Com-
mission is quite willing to accept out-of-pocket cost evidence in testing
whether proposed rates are compensatory. Such a showing will often
suffice unless the record of a case shows that, although compensatory
as thus measured, the proposed rates are designed to attract traffic for
a more "efficient" competitor—that is, one with lower full costs.
A recent classic illustration is found in the decision in Coal—Southern
MinestoTampaand Sutton, Florida, wherethe Commission authorized
the reduced rates, finding that they were compensatory in terms of
out-of-pocket cost coverage.28It is noteworthy that the traffic was
moving by private water transportation and beyond the reach of the
protesting barge lines, regardless of the rail rate.It seems clear that the
rates would not otherwise have been approved.
Some additional insights regarding the role of costs in competitive
rate regulation are provided by a survey of 350 Commission decisions
27Citedin Traffic World, January 26, 1963, pp. 11—14. Approval was subsequently
denied by the full Commission in an opinion handed down after this paper was
completed. This reversal, however, provides no significant new insights regarding
the role of costs in such litigation.
28&S. Docket No. 7179, October 1, 1962 (Mimeo).COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION 19
in rate reduction cases decided between March 14, 1960, and May 25,
1962.29 Formal cost evidence was introduced in 252, or 80 per cent, of
the cases surveyed.Costs were introduced exclusively by the pro-
ponents in 95 cases and by the protestants in 69, but both offered such
showings in most situations.
In terms of competitive relations, the bulk of the cases (319) fall into
three classes:truck intramodal (152);intermodal, with truck pro-
ponents and rail protestants (112); and intermodal, with the role of the
parties reversed (38).The relatively small representation of cases
involving rail reductions with motor carrier protests is noteworthy.
Cost evidence is more prominent in intermodal than in intramodal
cases, appearing in 90 per cent of the former (165 of 185 cases) but in
only 71 per cent of the latter (117 of 165). These percentages varied
significantly, however, with the participating agencies.Of the 152
truck iritramodal cases, costs were introduced in only 72 per cent.
But the ratio rose to 88 per cent in cases involving truck proponents and
rail protestants and jumped further to 95 per cent when the roles of the
parties were reversed. It is also noteworthy that motor carriers are less
prone to rely on cost evidence than the railroads. In rail rate cases, motor
carrier protestants supplied cost evidence in 55 per cent of the cases;
but in truck rate cases, the railroads used cost evidence in 80 per cent.
Surprisingly, in only 8 of the 252 cases did the cost evidence pertain
to fully-distributed costs.Out-of-pocket measures were involved in
219 cases, while in the others the report did not specify, possibly because
of the vagaries of the presentations. This suggests that the limitations
imposed by fully-distributed costs may not be as pervasive as one might
be led to believe. While it plays a great part in some important cases,
it does not seem to intrude routinely into competitive rate adjustments.
For the cases as a whole the denial rate was quite high (70 per cent),
with little difference based on whether or not cost evidence was involved.
The comparative figures were 68 and 72 per cent.But in the cases
invoking this evidence, cost reasons were very important for the denials,
either because the rates were found to be noncompensatory or because
the cost was inadequate to support the case. Such factors were
instrumental in 144 of the 192 denials, or 80 per cent.It is not sur-
prising that the denial rate is lower where only the proponent submits
cost evidence. This obtained in 59 of 93 cases, for a 63 per cent rate.
Similarly, where the protestants only supplied such evidence (69 cases),
denials rose to 78 per cent. A correlation analysis confirmed the
validity of the foregoing percentage relationships.
29Covering volumes309—316.20 COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION
These comparisons suggest some rather interesting and perhaps
surprising propositions.The great majority of cases involved re-
ductions in motor rather than rail rates. This balance, which prevails
for intermodal as well as for intramodal relationships, undoubtedly
reflects the greater competitiveness of the trucking industry.But it
certainly indicates that, despite their restiveness, the railroads are not
above invoking the protective cloak of regulation.Cost evidence
figures prominently in these proceedings and denials are generally
related to cost considerations. However, the evidence is predominately
related to out-of-pocket and not full-cost measurements.Since the
main denial basis is failure to establish the compensatory character
of the proposed rates (as measured by out-of-pocket costs), it appears
that the restrictions on pricing freedom imposed by full-cost tests do
not characterize the litigation.These restrictions may, however, be
relatively more important when measured in terms of associated
traffic volumes, a criterion which could not be tested in this survey.
The Effectiveness of Railway Rate Policy
'It has been alleged that railroad pricing in markets involving inter-
modal competition has been inept, bringing distress not only to com-
petitors but to the railroads themselves. This point was emphasized in
a paper delivered recently by a barge line official who based his con-
tentions on personal experiences.30 In more general terms, it is argued
by their competitors that railroads keep reducing rates and get worse
off financially year after year, with the clear implication that rate
reductions are at fault. If true, such allegations suggest either irrational
decision processes or a hopeless pricing situation. Whatever the cause,
such contentions must be of interest to students of transportation
pricing policy. The fruits of any consistent default of responsibility
are apt to be uneconomic price relationships and transport investment
levels, while the prospect of a continued drying-up of railroad revenues
is also a cause for concern. As the acknowledged price leaders in the
transport sector, railroads must pursue rational pricing goals and act
with reasonably adequate information inputs if competitive stability
NobleC. Parsonage, "Costs, Pricing and Discrimination," delivered at the
annual meetings of the American Transportation Research Forum, Pittsburgh, Pa.,
December 27, 1962. In Mr. Parsonage's words: "I have actually participated in a
case where the facts have shown that if the entire volume of the movement divided
between water and rail were to move all rail at the proposed reduced rates, it would
generate less gross revenue to the railroads than was being realized on the volume
handled at the higher rail rates" (p. 1).COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION 21
is to be achieved without the heavy hand of regulation.31 For example,
if railroad price makers are unduly fascinated by volume at the expense
of profits, the results may indeed be unfavorable for themselves as
well as for their competitors and even for the economy generally.
A detailed case-by-case evaluation of the results of railroad pricing
policy is well beyond the scope of this undertaking. But the problem is
of sufficient importance to warrant even generalized analysis in the hope
that some tentative conclusions may be reached.
The rate indexes published annually by the I.C.C. indicate, for all
commodities combined, an increase from 108 to 121 between 1954
and 1958 and a steady decline thereafter to 114 in 1961 (1950 =loO).32
The indexes for the 60 major commodities and commodity classes which
are computed individually conform generally to this same pattern, but
with rather substantial variations in the rates of change. For example,
between 1958 and 1961 the rate index for industrial sand declined from
128 to 127, while for automobiles it shot down 44 points from 122 to 78.
The following analysis attempts to evaluate the profitability of the
pricing actions underlying these index movements, with particular
reference to the reductions.It is based on interrelationships for the
1957—1960 period between the rate indexes and changes for each of the
commodities in rail tonnage carried, total market size (production
less local consumption), railroad market share, and railroad revenues.33
In over-all terms, the rate reductions have been modest and not
particularly fruitful. The general results for all commodities combined
are indicated for two periods in the following table.
Percentage Change in
TonsAdjusted Ratio of Rail Tons to
PeriodRate Level CarriedProduction Revenues Adjusted Production
1958—59 —2.5 +3.7 +6.4 +3.3 —2.7
1959—60 —1.8 +1.0 +2.8 —2.0
The rather small rate reduction of 2.5 per cent between 1958 and
1959 was accompanied by a 3.7 per cent increase in tonnage carried
and a nearly comparable advance in revenues.However, adjusted
production of all commodities (net of local consumption and thus
31Formoredetail on this rather obvious proposition, see Roberts, inLaw and
Contemporary Problems, Autumn 1959,pp. 570—78.
32 I.C.C.,Bureauof Transport Economics, Indexesof Average Freight Rates on
Railroad Carload Traffic, 1953—1961(Statement RI-I,1963).
From I.C.C., Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics, Fluctuations in
RailroadTonnageCompared with Production,ClassILine-HaulRailroads, 1958,
1959, and 1960, StatementNo. 6301 (1963).22 COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION
representing the size of the aggregate market) jumped by 6.4 per cent,
occasioning a decline in the railroads' market share. Thus, even with
the reduction railroads were unable to get a proportionate share of
the new volume. The 1959—60 story was about the same except that
total revenue also declined.
More interesting than these gross figures, however, are some details
for the sixty specific commodities or commodity classes for which rate
indexes are separately computed. Table 1, which takes account of the
1957—58, 1958—59, and 1959—60 price changes, shows the results for
each. Increases predominated in the 1957—58 period; rate indexes for
forty-nine classes went up, compared with only six reductions and five
cases of no change. At the same time, revenues increased for sixteen
classes and declined for the other forty-four. In the other two periods,
however, decreases predominated, representing forty-seven of the cases
in 1958—59 and fifty-five in 1959—60.In these two periods revenues
declined in twenty and forty-three of the cases, respectively.
Because of demand shifts induced by changed market size and other
factors, the foregoing comparisons have little to say about railroad
service demand elasticity. Where market size expands (for nonprice
reasons), the total revenue figures overstate the true effect of the price
change as such, while the reverse is true for shrunken markets. Deeper
probing is thus provided by factoring the total revenue change into its
components in order to isolate and the portion attributable
to the changed market size.34
Since most markets expanded, the revenue effect net of shifts in
market size are generally less favorable than when total revenue change
is measured. The direction of the adjusted revenue changes are shown










1957—58 1958—59 1959—60 Total
PositiveNegativePositiveNegativePositive NegativePositiveNegative
58 13 36 4 2 1 2 18 40
15 1 4 1 6 1 2 3 12
107 0 6 7 40 7 47 14 93
180 14 46 12 48 9 51 35 145
Revenue changes attributable to the various influences were derived as follows:
1. Price change: price change (per cent) x R1 (first period revenue).
2. Change in market size: per cent change in adjusted production x R1.
3. Change in tons carried: per cent change in tons x
4. Price acting on tons carried:(3) —(2).
5. Interaction of market size and price change: price change (per cent) x (2).
6. Interaction of tons carried and price change: price change (per cent) >< (4).
7. Combined effects: sum of(1) + (4) + (6) + (7).





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.26 COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION
The strong inference from the table is that railroad pricing actions have
indeed been singularly unfruitful. Only in scattered cases has a decline
in the rate index been associated with an increase in the revenue attained
from a particular class of traffic when change in market size is taken
into account.
The direction of the revenue increment is a reflection of the effective-
ness of railroad pricing policy in the face of the strategy or any "in-
herent" market advantages of their competitors. A closer look reveals
the strength with which other market forces have actually counteracted
increases in market size, as well as the potential traffic-stimulating effect
of most rate reductions. In a number of extreme cases, in fact, large
increases in market size were so completely counteracted that the
volume after the price decrease was less than in the initial period.
In the 1959—60 period, thirty-five rate reductions were accompanied
by a market expansion. Despite this favorable market trend, tonnage
increases occurred in only fifteen cases, eight of which increased more
slowly than the market enlargement. The rate reductions induced an
output expansion beyond what would have been expected from in-
creased market size in only seven (or one-fifth) of the cases. But in an
even more extreme instance, twenty of the thirty-five price reductions
were associated with an absolute decline in tonnage carried, perversely
suggesting a positively sloping demand function and indicating the
power of the forces eroding the railroad's market position.
The strength of these antirailroad forces can be roughly measured
by relating the increased output expectable from the market expansion
to the actual tonnage contractions. The sum of the potential revenue
increment attributable to market growth, plus the decline actually
realized, provides a rough absolute measure of the contributing in-
fluences in the twenty cases.Dividing this sum by the first amount
reduces this measure to relative terms and produces a "revenue shrink-
age ratio" based on the values derived from the factoring processes
previously described (footnote 34). A ratio of one denotes a complete
offset of the increased market potential, while a higher ratio indicates
an even greater revenue depression. A ratio of two, for example,
means that the counteracting forces depleted revenues by double the
expansion dictated by the enlarged market, despite the reduced prices.
The "shrinkage ratios" thus derived for 1959—60 generally range up to
nearly seven, with a further jump to seventeen.Extremely powerful
adverse market forces are clearly at work here.
The relationship of rate policy to prevailing revenue/out-of-pocket
ratios is also of interest (see Table 1).Most surprising is the ratherCOSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION 27
large number of cases where reductions occurred in the face of ratios
below 100, which was true of ten of the fifty-five downward adjustments
in the 1959—60 period. Although the revisions were generally nominal,
they ranged on occasion up to 7 per cent.Unless rather sharply de-
clining variable costs are anticipated, the rationale for these price
changes is most obscure. On the other hand, a number of the re-
ductions were associated with ratios well above the 129 all-commodity
average, including twenty-nine of the fifty-five recorded in the 1959—60
period.This suggests that cost considerations frequently did not
impose tight limits on the reported rate decreases.
While the data are too sparse and too generalized to permit any real
diagnosis or prescriptions, several tentative conclusions are suggested
by the foregoing discussion.It is evident that, in general, railroad
price reductions have not thus far contributed to profitability in
absolute terms.It is possible, of course, that market reactions are
sticky and that any positive benefits from rate cuts will emerge only
over a longer time period than was observed here. This effect, however,
does not show up in the data studied. In any case, it is apparent from
the demand shifts that railroad pricing policy faces extreme difficulties
(including possibly an inexorable trend away from rail transportation),
substantial price insensitivity of much traffic, or the rather consistent
ability of competitors to outmaneuver the railroads in pricing actions.
Price reductions of the kind reviewed clearly offer no panacea for
dealing with the industry's financial ills.
While commonly unprofitable in a positive way, itis obviously
possible that reduced rates may still yield larger revenues than higher
ones.Although judgments about such relative profitability are ex-
tremely cloudy because of the lack of information about the course of
nonrail rates and other vital factors, some of the cited evidence is
relevant. The observed limitation on tonnage and revenue expansion,
imposed by the contrary market forces, must stem from either inelastic
demand, unfavorable demand shifts, or both. To the extent that in-
elastic demand is the cause, the reductions are certainly a mistake.
Demand shifts are clearly an important factor unless the anomaly of
positively sloping demand functions is accepted. Some additional clues
to the relative profitability of reductions are thus afforded by a con-
sideration of the character and basis of these shifts.If, in particular,
they are due to changes in the prices of substitutes, a vital question is
whether these price movements were induced by or occasioned the
railroad rate reductions. Although it is impossible to generalize about
the antecedents of the price changes examined here, the railroads are28 COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION
commonly regarded as the price leaders.Where they did start the
action (and the changed price relationships are the cause of the de-
mand shift), they would have been better off to maintain the status quo.
Inthis situation the absolute unprofitability of a reduction also
spells relative unprofitability.In other words, rate reductions are
not generally profitable even in these relative terms where there
isareasonable chance of maintaining market shares with rate
stability.
It is probable, however, that much of the unfavorable shift in demand
is due to forces other than price relationships, or to a continued change
in the transportation service requirements of the economy. In this case,
no generalizations regarding the relative profitability of price reductions
can be drawn from the available data. But it seems likely that decreases
may be the appropriate response in such a situation.It is noteworthy,
however, that in the cases observed price policy has not generally coped
effectively with demand changes.It may be significant that these price
changes have been rather modest. Manyc furthermore, were associated
with relatively high revenue-cost ratios, offering an opportunity to
counter both such adverse market forces and competitive price re-
sponses. This suggests that in some cases at least reductions should
possibly be far bolder than they appear to be from this sample. The
potential expansivity of the traffic involved is indicated by the very low
rail market shares that characterize these commodities, all running
below, and most far below, 50 per cent.35
Regardless of other lessons that this discussion might offer, it seems
clear that fully effective railroad pricing policy under present adverse
conditions undoubtedly requires far greater insights into market
behavior than are presently available. A great deal of attention has
been devoted to the cost (or supply) side of transportation markets.
Certainly the same intensive effort is required on the demand side.
Transport Costs and Discrimination Control
The pricing system obtained by maximizing net revenues in particular
markets is, of course, highly discriminatory. When unallocable costs
find their way into prices through differentiated demand functions,
there will generally be an inequality of P —MCrelationships. How-
ever, the system does improve utilization of railway plant that is fixed
Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics, Fluctuations in Railroad Freight
TrafficCompared with Produciion, Class1 Line-Haul Railroads, 1958, 1959, and 1960
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over relatively long time periods, and permits a reasonable degree of
managerial discretion in responding to market forces. In this process
some prices will be set below average costs at the prevailing output
level, creating "downward discrimination." Others will rise above this
measure where demand elasticities permit.
In theory, shippers paying below-average and above-average rates
benefit along with the transportation companies from these price
relationships. The gain to the shippers from the downward discrim-
ination is apparent, while transport companies ostensibly benefit from
the greater utilization and lower average costs induced by the relatively
low charges. But completely happy results are not assured from the
workings of this pricing system. To the extent that transport rates
depart differentially from costs, uneconomic patterns of resource use
are encouraged in the nontransport sectors of the economy. Further-
more, it is not necessarily true that the shippers paying rates reflecting
upward discrimination are better off.36 In other words, in the abstract
at least, some form of discrimination control is indicated to limit the
unfavorable effect on the nontransport sector of the economy and to
insure that the rates assessed in the highly inelastic markets do not
injure rather than benefit the affected shippers.
In this context, low rates are justified only if they contribute more
than higher rates to the support of the system and thus diminish the
financial burden on other traffic.The basic social justification for
discrimination requires, therefore, that the high rates are less than they
would be with nondiscriminatory charges. Accordingly, higher than
average rates are unjustified if they exceed amounts dictated by the
output and unit cost that would be associated with rates represented
by uniform relations with marginal costs.37 To illustrate, assume output
(sales) of 50,000 units under discrimination but only 30,000 under
uniform pricing, with unit costs of 2.0 and 2.3 cents respectively.In
this case, shippers paying more than 2.3 cents would be better off
without discrimination; such rates thus assess an unjustified burden
of support which violates the basic social rationale of this pricing
system.This test contrasts sharply with the present comparative
Othershave, of course, pointed this out.See, for example, Merton Miller,
"Decreasing Average Cost and the Theory of Railway Rates," SouthernEconomic
Journal,Vol.21, p. 39.
" Sincedifferent services are not homogeneous but incur varying direct or out-of-
pocket costs, discrimination is not eliminated by uniform rates per unit of output,
but by a uniform ratio between rates and out-of-pocket costs.In the following
discussion, this is the meaning attached to the removal of discrimination and to
references to "uniform pricing."30 COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION
system which, devoid of external or objective measurements, circularly
permits one high rate to justify another.
It would be strictly an academic exericse to labor the question of rate
ceilings if the present degree of transport competition insures that
economic limits of rates are not exceeded. But it is apparent that sub-
stitution elasticity varies widely among transport markets, depending
on such factors as haul distance and commodity characteristics.
Furthermore, the substitutional impact of one major alternative, barge
transportation, is rather restricted geographically. It is possible, there-
fore, that residual monopoly powers (or even regulatory rate floors)
may permit degrees of discrimination that exceed socially acceptable
standards. Meyer and his associates conclude from their analysis of
the demand characteristics of transportation that they "do not set an
effective ceiling on the rates of non-competing traffic at a level that
precludes monopoly profits." 38
Althoughnot providing evidence regarding its economic legitimacy,
the I.C.C.'s revenue contribution studies describe the sweep of dis-
crimination in rail rates through revenue/out-of-pocket cost ratios for
the different territorial movements of the various commodity classes.
Table 2 shows the 1960 distribution of ton-miles by revenue-cost ratios
which exceed that year's average of 129. The ratios rise to relatively
high levels, ranging to over 500 per cent of out-of-pocket costs. Signifi-
cant traffic volumes are involved, with nearly 17 per cent of 1960 traffic
bearing rates representing revenue-cost ratios over 170. There may be
some basis for suspecting that rates in these extreme reaches of dis-
crimination are unduly high.If so, it is worthwhile to indulge in some
speculations regarding the reasonableness of these rates in terms of the
cost-oriented uniform pricing test that was previously advanced.
Cost studies of the Commission's staff indicate that, at generally
prevailing traffic densities, costs are about 70 per cent variable and
30 per cent fixed in the "long run." The actual behavior of the out-of-
pocket or variable portion of total costs is conjectural, but the cost
studies indicate that these outlays are unchanged per unit as volume
changes. This behavior will be adopted as a simplifying assumption in
this analysis. Based on these cost functions, it is possible to measure
the inflation in unit costs from a given percentage decline in traffic and
the resulting percentage increase in the average rate level that would be
required to meet all costs, including present overhead coverage. For
example, if uniform pricing occasioned a 40 per cent traffic reduction,
Meyer eta!., Economics of Competition, pp. 201—202.COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION 31
fixed costs would increase by 100 per cent but total unit costs by only
20 per cent. To cover this increase and maintain the same total revenue
contribution, rates would have to be set for all traffic at 155percent of
out-of-pocket costs (where 1960 was 129).
The indicated traffic and revenue effectof uniform pricing at any
given ratio of out-of-pocket costs depends upon the price elasticity of
rail transport demand in particular markets, and upon the distribution
of total traffic volume in terms of revenue-cost ratios. The latter factor
is associated with the former since it determines the percentage changes
in price (both increases and decreases) which would be involved in
moving to uniformity at a given level. For example, output would be
less seriously affected by the shift to uniformity if there are substantial
blocks of traffic, moving at relatively high rates, which would be
benefited by the contemplated reduction (representing the effect of
traffic distribution). This would be particularly true if the reductions
occasioned sharp increases in the movements of these commodities
(representing the elasticity effect). On the other hand, large volumes at
lower rate levels, with heavy price increases, would enhance the output
reduction, particularly if the associated demands are highly elastic.
Traffic distributionisavailable from the Interstate Commerce
Commission's 1 per cent waybill sample, and the rate-cost ratios from
the revenue-contribution studies. But since the elasticities are subject
to conjecture at this stage of transport market analysis, it is impossible
to assess accurately the traffic effects of uniform pricing, or to determine
the uniform level of rates which would permit full overhead coverage.
Some general indications may be provided, however, by testing the
possibility of achieving a traffic level 60 per cent of the present level,
with rates uniformly set at 155 per cent of out-of-pocket cost. This is
the level that would be required for full overhead coverage, if costs are
70 per cent variable.
On the surface, at least, it appears that the prospects of retaining the
required portion of present output with such prices are not at all remote.
According to the I.C.C. waybill data, nearly one billion ton-miles (or
about one-quarter of the sample total), entail rates exceeding the
indicated level.39 This traffic nucleus by itself represents nearly half of
the required output, and a reduction in these relatively high rates
(ranging to over 500 per cent) to a level 155 per cent of out-of-pocket
Computed from data in I.C.C., Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics,
Territorial Traffic and Revenue by Commodity Classes, Carload Waybill Statistics,
1960, Statement TD-1; and, Distribution of Rail Revenue Contribution by Commodity
Groups, 1960, Statement 2-62.32 COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION
TABLE2
DISTRIBUTIONOF TON MILES BY REVEI"LJE COST RATIOS, 1960







130—149 745,727,000 17.183 17.183
150—169 453,546,000 10.450 27.633
170—199 359,050,000 8.273 34.906
200—249 367,974,000 8.018 43.924
250—299 27,856,000 0.641 44.565
300—349 1,982,000 0.045 44.610
350—399 763,000 0.017 44.627
400—449 998,000 0.022 44.649
450—499 224,000 0.005 44.654
500 and over 1,686,000 0.038 44.692
SourceiRevenue—cost ratios from I.C.C., Bureau of Accounts,
Distributionof the Rail Revenue Contribution by Cori7nedity
Grovpe ...1960(Statementlb. 2—62,1962).Ton miles from
I.C.C.,Bureauof TransportEconomicsand Statistics, Tern—
toz'ial Traffio and Revenue by Con'rnodity Classes,
CarloadWaybill Statistics, 1960 (Statement TD—l, Supplement,
1961).
costsshould occasion a significant expansion in this volume. The
transport demands for many of these commodities were undoubtedly
quite inelastic when the high-rate patterns were established in the days
of extensive railroad monopoly. They are undoubtedly more elastic
now in view of the heavy inroads that have been made by competitive
transportation. Rate reductions of the order premised here, therefore,
would probably stimulate much additional volume.
The potential expansibility of this sector is indicated by the fact that
during 1960 the railroads handled an over-all average of only about
one-quarter of the total tonnage movement of the commodities in-
volved.4°The hypothetical level of rates should be competitively
attractive in tapping the huge balance in this traffic reservoir; rates at
155 per cent of out-of-pocket costs would, in 1960, have averaged only
2.5 cents per ton-mile—well below the regulated average cost for truck-
ing.It seems reasonable to conclude that most of the output required
to sustain present overhead coverage (60 per cent of existing volume)
would be realized from traffic now moving at ratios exceeding the
155 ratio.
Furthermore, a substantial volume of traffic moving at ratios less
than 155 could probably be retained. This would particularly be true
in the sector involving ratios between 130 and 155 where rates are above
4°Computed from datainFluctuationsin Railroad Traffic.COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION 33
average. In the waybill sample, this sector included 800 million ton-
miles, another fifth of the total. Assuming this volume to be evenly
distributed within the indicated ratio limits, the resulting average rate
advance amounts to only 10 per cent. Many of the transportation
demands associated with these above-average rates would probably be
somewhat inelastic, indicating that rate increases would occasion a less
than proportionate volume reduction from the rate advance premised.
But even if unitary elasticity is assumed, most of this traffic could be
retained, along with the expanded assured amount in the ratio sector
over 155.Finally, although the demands are in many cases highly
elastic, some of the vast volume moving at ratios less than 130 would
continue to move at higher rates.
Although far from conclusive, the foregoing considerations at least
suggest that a uniformly established rate ratio of 155 could sustain the
level of traffic volume required to support present overhead coverage.
But even if it should fall a little short, so that average cost (including
overhead) would rise somewhat above the level associated with the
155 ratio, these considerations call into serious question the present
rates which are at levels substantially exceeding this ratio. This would
certainly appear to be true of rates exceeding double out-of-pocket
Costs.
The foregoing arguments should not be construed as advocating cost-
based pricing with uniform overhead contributions. The possible effect
of this system was considered only in order to visualize its implications
for volume, average costs, and appropriate discrimination limits.
Discrimination is still a valid railroad pricing device, but its range may
quite possibly be excessive in terms of the cost structures associated
with present-day traffic densities.Any rates that exceed a ceiling
indicated by the test described here are questionable since the shippers
involved are worse and not better off with discrimination. Assuming,
however, that the lower rates make their best contribution to overhead,
neither public or private purposes would be served by arbitrarily
increasing them to some stipulated ratio.Discrimination below the
ceiling facilitates overhead coverage and reduces average costs and
over-all rate levels, thus truly benefitting those paying above-average
rates. But to confine discrimination within the stipulated limits would
minimize the distortions associated with uneconomic patterns of
resource use.In short, discrimination thus restricted would be both
more equitable and more economic.
The reduction of excessively high rates may imply a revenue gap and
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more than possible that many of the offending rates are not only exces-
sive by the standards advanced but are uneconomically high in terms
of maximizing overhead coverage. Furthermore, any realistic system
of discrimination control should insure that rates at the other end of
the axis are not uneconomically low in terms of their revenue con-
tribution potential. The large number of movements failing to cover
the Commission's measure of out-Qf-pocket. costs aggregated a deficit
of $243 million in 1960.41 The mere elimination of these deficits (e.g.,
by dropping the traffic) would enhance overhead coverage by nearly
15 per cent.It is likely that much of the traffic involved would, if
appropriately priced, make a positive contribution. Furthermore, there
must be an interesting volume which does not produce deficits but
which is favored by rates which are still uneconomically low.
It is possible, however, that further restraints on upward discrimi-
nation might restrict over-all earnings and prevent overhead coverage.
Such restrictions are certainly not inconsistent with present regulatory
policy since the rate structure is honeycombed with maximum rate
orders, at least some of which must be of more than token significance.
But the desirability of tighter discrimination limits represents a trans-
port policy problem of some magnitude.
From one viewpoint, there is no apparent reason for "monopoly"
traffic asa class tocontribute significantly more to the financial support
of the system than does competitive traffic under a system of regulation
which isdesigned torestrict rates to "reasonable" levels.Itis
precisely in the competitive sector of the economy that, by definition,
a "normal" return is earned. In other words, where competition is at
work, the market determines financial rewards and investment returns.
Fair competition does not generally provide undue restraints on earn-
ings and there is no reason to expect it to do so in transportation,
particularly with the usual regulatory limits on the pressures of price
competition.If a normal return is appropriately construed as that
accorded under competition, there is no reason to have to "make up"
anything on that portion of a company's business that is not subject to
competitive pressures.If realizable returns are not adequate, in the
face of competition, to induce and support additional investment, it
should not be made; certainly it should not require the support of
monopoly returns in noncompetitive markets.
On the other hand, hewing too closely to the line of more rigorous
discrimination control and thus curtailing profit opportunities in the
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railroadindustry may have an adverse effect on innovation and other
socially desirable elements of progress.If investment beyond that
dictated by competitive market forces (either actual or as simulated by
regulation) are regarded as desirable, the available alternatives are,
apparently, to subsidize the railroads or permit them to tap markets
for all they can get. There are strong arguments for subsidy since the
cost of social objectives can thus be born by the economy as a whole
rather than by a limited number of consumers and producers or
ecomonic sectors.
If the subsidy approach is neither feasible nor palatable, and earnings
in excess of competitive allowances are indeed required, recourse to
highly discriminatory rates is indicated. In this case, the elimination of
present maximum rate controls may be called for.If, on the other hand,
it is regarded as desirable to limit discrimination in order to strike a
more judicious balance between its advantages and its costs, a close
look at governing standards and other criteria is required. Although
such control has been one of the important functions of regulation, it is
questionable whether the historic concepts and methods are adequate
to maximize the gains and minimize the costs of discrimination. The
comparative method of testing rates was perhaps adequate in earlier
years when the forms and procedures of regulation were developed.
in the era of lower traffic densities, the legitimate sweep of discrimi-
nation was much broader than at present, and the opportunity for
developing refined tests was limited by the relative crudity of the.
available analytical techniques and machines.Although perhaps
formerly necessary and adequate, the comparative method under which
one high rate justifies another is plagued with circularity and provides
no standards of any real vitality and validity.
As the need has changed, analytical methods and opportunities have
improved immeasurably. But rational data exploitation is impossible
without a comparable improvement in the concepts of rate control. If
maximum rate control is to be continued, the feasibility of employing
the "uniform pricing" test suggested here should be explored.
Conclusions: Concepts and Their Operationality
In this paper I have argued for the conceptual validity of transport rates
related to incremental rather than to "full" costs;rates geared to
demand conditions rather than to cost allocation formulas. According
to this argument, "market-oriented" rates pass muster reasonably well
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inimicable to viable investment levels or to interagency traffic allocations
consistent with efficient distribution patterns. Stated more positively,
rates not fettered by regulatory ties to full-cost criteria can produce
economic results as satisfactory as those realized from the operation
of the price system in the economy generally. Commission regulation,
however, is prone to distrust these results and to stifle market forces in
key cases by inappropriately gearing competitive rates to fully dis-
tributed costs.
But the virtues of the market-oriented prices depend on the quality
of the performance of both regulation and private management.
Regulation must guard against any excessive discrimination that might
arise from the pursuit of maximum profits in separate markets. Effec-
tive performance of this function requires far more refined and sophis-
ticated tests—including both concepts and measurements—than have
been applied in the past.Costly inefficiencies can also creep into
"market-oriented" prices from the private (management) side. Clearly
some modification of the historic monopoly-based "value-of-service"
rates are in order. But gratuitous rate reductions that do not improve
net revenues (and that are not required to realign rates exceeding the
acceptable limits of discrimination) undermine the financial integrity
of the transport system, impair investment adequacy, and create
inefficient long-run trafficallocations.On the other hand, undue
pricing conservatism, particularly on the part of the railroads, may
produce the same results.
Unfortunately, the right path is not clearly marked. The zeal for
"cost-finding," important as it is, digs up only part of the answer;
cost measures tell only the scope of rate reductions that is tolerable, not
what is socially efficient or privately desirable.All of the ordinary
complexities of oligopolistic (and, with the rate bureaus, duopolistic)
price behavior are compounded by the intricate interrelationships of
transport costs, rates and total distribution systems.As shippers
perceive and measure these interrelationships with greater refinement,
distribution requirements become the key to transport demand.It
seems to be a safe assertion that despite all of the complexities, far more
is known about the measurement of transport costs than of demand.
It is questionable, indeed, whether the problem of demand measurement
has even been fully conceptualized in the specialized context of trans-
portation since commodity value lost its meaning.
The need for greater understanding of demand, and of transport
markets generally, is urgent for both pricing and its regulation. This
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of the economy. Only through the improved insights thus afforded
will there be a reasonable expectation that transport prices—with or
without regulation—will produce tolerably efficient allocations.
COMMENT
JAMES W. McKIE, Vanderbilt University
This paper confirms again what has often been remarked about the
comparative-statics approach to the theory of cost: the inadequacy
of the long-run cost curve of the firm as a tool of economic analysis.
Its inadequacies are not in logic but in application. In public utility
economics, much more than in analysis of competitive firms, the long-
run cost curve repeatedly fails to tell us what we want to know about
long-run costs.It almost always turns out that some functional
relationship other than the classic one is the one that counts. The
classic relationship is that between simple volume, moving in an un-
changing grid of time and space, and average cost with all factors fully
variable. In railroad economics, the volume measure for such a con-
cept, as Nelson points out elsewhere in this volume, is density of use
per mile of railroad. Yet the dimensions of a real problem for decision
may include this one only secondarily, if at all, and usually turns on
some other—on geographical extensions or cross-connections, second-
ary systems, bottlenecks, different bases of service, central-station
balance in different distributive configurations, or load-factor problems
of one kind and another. These produce cost relationships that are
hybrids of long- and short-run elements, reflecting several output
dimensions and often containing some effects of technological change.
These essentially nonreversible cost functions, rather than the classic
envelope cost curve, are the ones that are relevant to the problems
that have actually arisen.
What confronts us now is a problem of transition—from monopoly
toward competition, and from value-of-service pricing toward cost-of-
service pricing in transportation.But, because the railroads still have
prodigious economies of scale, indivisibilities, and inflexibilities, they
cannot simply be fitted into the new pattern like a small piece into a
mosaic. Though their size and scope will be reduced compared with
what they were in the days of monopoly, they cannot simply be
squeezed down to the appropriate size along the same path they followed
when they were expanding. The railroads can be squeezed right out of
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in that transportation equilibrium that we have had so much difficulty in
visualizing. If the railroads do survive, some indivisibilities must remain,
and no doubt some value-of-service prices will remain along with them.
Professor Roberts asks the right questions: what will be the size of
the railroad system in equilibrium, when all agencies of transport have
finally been fitted into the optimum pattern? And will the costs, the
rate structure, and volume of traffic appropriate to that equilibrium
permit the railroads to survive and prosper? One might suggest
additional considerations for the answers. Some kinds of service, and
some of the costs associated with them, can be eliminated without
affecting the cost-density relationship on trunk lines.Roberts himself
notes that dropping the traffic which fails to cover out-of-pocket costs
would itself enhance overhead coverage. Some of this traffic would
still move at higher rates. Such measures as dropping passenger traffic,
or at least handing over commuter services to some welfare agency,
would greatly reduce losses without appreciably affecting unit costs on
the remaining traffic.The abandonment of spur lines, backwater
traffic, and lightly used branches might do likewise without necessarily
affecting the density of traffic on main lines, since much traffic is
shifting its locus with the increasing geographic polarization of popu-
lation and economic activity. Where spur lines or weak branch systems
are thickly grafted onto a trunk line which would otherwise be strong,
some means must be found for lessening the load of debt and capital
claims left behind when such unecomonic facilities are abandoned. It
seems to me that this would be a most fruitful way to use government
financial help, since the only other way to reduce the burden of claims
in line with a reduced plant is through bankruptcy and reorganization.
Turning now to the question of rate structure, a consensus seems to
be emerging among economists who have recently been studying the
problem of interagency competition. It is roughly as follows: (1) Short-
run fully allocated (average) costs are not an appropriate basis of pricing
for railroads.(2) The appropriate minimum standard of price for
railroads is long-run marginal cost.(3) This is also an appropriate
minimum standard for other transport agencies, but because of their
particular cost relationships, long-run marginal cost will be very close
to short-run. average cost (for all except pipelines—a special case with
a decisive advantage in one commodity). (4) Hence, a rational allo-
cation of freight traffic (excepting pipelines) among competing agencies
will be achieved if prices are equal to minimum short-run average costs
including a competitive profit for motor trucking and water transport.
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competing agencies for the traffic in question, but the railroad's long-
run marginal cost would be a minimum. This much of value-of-service
pricing would remain in the equilibrium of transport rates. Of course,
the railroads might well be priced out of the market for short hauls, or
where speed of delivery is either very important or so unimportant that
the waterways' advantages in bulk transport will tell.
But what is this long-run marginal cost that is to be the minimum
for railroad rates? Not the same marginal cost that the railroads could
look forward to if they were building their entire plant de novo.It is,
instead, one of those hybrid concepts. If we take the present plant and
shake out the uneconomic parts of it mentioned earlier, the long-run
marginal cost is the incremental cost of equipment and long-run
maintenance, plus the variable-factor cost, associated with increases in
the volume of traffic in the neighborhood of the volume that will move
when priced competitively as suggested. Rates equaling or exceeding
this "LMC" are economic. It should not be hard to find a reasonably
correct measure of this minimum. It is clearly lower than fully allocated
short-run average costs for the railroads.
The concept of nontransport distribution cost (NTC) suggested by
Roberts is a useful measure of "service advantage." The rule contem-
plated is that the railroad should be permitted to capture any traffic
from other carriers if its LMC, as defined above, plus its NTC is less
than their minimum SAC plus their NTC for the traffic. The rail rate
may be brought as low as necessary to accomplish this result, provided
it exceeds LMC. Since most types of traffic are diverted from competing
carriers only by degrees, this rule for the railroad would amount
virtually to value-of-service pricing above LMC, adjusted to the new
competitive circumstances which have greatly increased demand
elasticity for most railroad transportation services.
If this interpretation of the consensus is correct, it also means that
the regulatory authority should not use short-run average cost as a
minimum standard for rail rates, but it would be justified in preventing
cuts below rail LMC down to short-run out-of-pocket cost or below it.
Many critics believe, however, that the antitrust laws, rather than rigid
rate regulation, are the best weapon against "predatory" pricing by
railroads, and that the regulatory authority often insists on a "fair"
division of traffic and preservation of competing vested interests when
wholly unjustified by the underlying economic relationships.
What would the suggested principles of rate-making do to the present
allocation of traffic? What would the equilibrium allocation be, under
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as we should, considering that we need to predict whether the railroads
could survive under those circumstances and whether massive reallo-
cations and shrinkages in capacity of other agencies of transport might
be necessary during the transition. The indivisibilities and economies
of scale of the railroad are good reasons for our special solicitude for
its traffic volume, to say nothing of its remaining position as the sole
available carrier for some types of freight movement. It is much easier
to effect a shrinkage in truck or waterway capacity without strong
effects on unit costs.If such shrinkage were indicated, ways could be
found to ease the transition for those carriers. (It is probably too much
to hope in addition for imposition of full user charges and a cessation
of uneconomic waterway development.)
Many of the estimates of minimum railroad freight volume under
flexible pricing that I have seen seem to be on the low side. Some of
these estimates are based on inferences from simple commodity char-
acteristics rather than on calculations of cost and transportation
demand. Roberts' own calculations are not designed to answer this
question, but to show what might happen under strict cost-of-service
pricing. We can take this as a minimum estimate or most pessimistic
limit of the railroads' share in the total transport volume, assuming
uniform rates. If the rules indicated above were followed instead, traffic
for the railroads would very likely increase markedly instead of dimin-
ishing.Recent experience suggests that more rational pricing may
recapture large volumes of remunerative traffic. One can refer to the
multiple-car rates for coal, or the reduced grain rates which have
elicited cries of unfair competition from the waterway carriers in the
South.Minimum-volume rates and all-commodity rates are also
promising, and the lower rates for automobiles combined with techno-
logical innovations in automobile carriage have apparently been suc-
cessful. Rail-truck piggyback service may decisively reduce the railroad
handicap of high terminal costs and slow service on package freight
and manufactured goods, for all except very short hauls. In spite of
Roberts' unfavorable findings on past experience with railroad rate
reductions, the general picture of prices and demand elasticities at
present leads me to believe that a massive and comprehensive reform
of transport price policy would not only increase the rails' share of
traffic but also have a strongly favorable effect on their revenues. But I
agree with Nelson that these reorganizations, abandonments, re-
juvenations and pricing reforms must be put into effect without delay;
else the momentum of decline for the railroads may become too strong
to reverse, short of government receivership.COSTS, PRICING, AND REGULATION 41
HOWARD W. NICHOLSON, Clark University
Roberts' paper deals with controversial issues of minimum and
maximum rate regulation. He stresses the desirability of permitting
railroads to lower rates to incremental costs, by which he means costs
incurred in producing additional units of service. Roberts states that
he is interested in allocative efficiency and he argues that, in view of
the existence of large fixed costs, maximum use of the rail system can be
encouraged by discriminatory rate policies, that is, by stressing demand
factors in the determination of rates. Despite evidence which he has
collected which suggests that rate cuts may prove to be disappointing
in increasing profits, Roberts appears to be relatively hopeful that the
elasticity of demand for rail service will be high when cuts of sufficient
size are undertaken. He also seems optimistic about the success of
aggressive discriminatory pricing policies in contributing to the revenue
needs of the railroads. The contrast between the views of Nelson and
Roberts in this regard is striking, and it is a matter of considerable
importance as to which position is correct. This subject deserves more
careful examination.
Important as itis, the question of the effectiveness of rail-rate
reductions in attracting additional revenue to the railroads is but part
of the current problem of transportation pricing policy, and concern
with railroad rate-making has tended to obscure more fundamental
pricing questions. Complete analysis of transport pricing policy should
involve consideration of the implications of pricing arrangements for:
1. investment in transport facilities, 2. use of existing facilities, and
3. the cost and quality of transportation service.
Although Roberts flirts with cost considerations and occasionally
alludes to the relevance of price-cost considerations for investment
decisions and industrial location, his paper creates the impression that
he is primarily interested in rate-making practices that will encourage
fuller utilization of existing railroad plant. He does not seem to be
vitally concerned with the implications of pricing from the standpoint
of the long-run problem of encouraging efficient investment in transport
facilities, nor does he seem to attach much significance to development
of transport rate structures which will encourage a more rational
pattern of industrial location. The essential difference between Roberts
and those—like myself—who advocate the development of rate policies
in which rates are encouraged to bear a reasonable relationship to
long-run marginal costs is that the disputants are concerned with
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Roberts deserves credit for emphasizing, as he has done, the danger
that emphasis on costs in transportation rates may in practice produce
policies that tend to keep rates too high.I agree that policy does better
to err somewhat on the side of encouraging flexibility in rate-making.
But I regard as either wrongheaded or shortsighted economists who
push transport investment problems under the rug and assume that by
disregarding the problems of fixed costs in rate-making and letting
nature take its course, somehow problems of resource allocation in
transportation investment and problems of industrial location will be
smoothly resolved. Is it not paradoxical that the competition that has
developed in transportation and upon which we economists have come
to depend for rationalization of domestic transportation affairs, is in
fact a competition for railroads from transportation agencies which
derive very large amounts of fixed capital from government sources.
A crucial issue for modern transport pricing policy and one to which
Roberts' analysis does not give sufficient weight is that of investment
policy and the relationship which transport pricing bears to investment
flows into the transportation system as a Whole.